This paper examines the welfare tradeo between patent and antitrust law. Since patent and antitrust law have contradictory goals, the question that naturally arises is how one should choose between the two in instances where there is a conict. One sensible approach to choosing between two legal standards, or between proof standards with respect to evidence, is to consider the relative costs of errors. The approach in this paper is to consider the ratio of false positives to false negatives in patent antitrust. We nd that the relevant error cost ratio for patent antitrust is the proportion of the sum of the monopoly prot and the residual consumer surplus to the deadweight loss. This error cost ratio, for a wide range of deterministic demand functions, ranges from innity to a low of roughly three. This suggests that patent antitrust law should err on the side of protecting innovation incentives.
Introduction
This paper examines the welfare tradeo between patent and antitrust law. Patent law enables the patent holder to obtain and exploit a monopoly lawfully. Antitrust law regulates the acquisition, maintenance, and, to some degree, the exploitation of monopoly power.
Since patent and antitrust law have supercially contradictory goals, the question that naturally arises is how one should choose between the two in instances where there appears to be a conict.
There are methods of exploiting patent monopolies that have been treated as antitrust violations. For example, the Federal Trade Commission recently sued Qualcomm, a manufacturer of communications technology, on the theory that the rm had abused its patent monopoly by adopting a two-part pricing scheme in the licensing and sale of its smartphone semiconductor chips.
One sensible approach to choosing between two legal standards, or two proof standards with respect to evidence, is to consider the relative costs of errors. Overenforcement generates false positives, cases where the regulated rm is punished or prohibited from taking a certain action when society should prefer that the action be taken. Underenforcement generates false negatives, cases where society should prefer that the excused rm be punished or prohibited from taking action.
The approach in this paper is to consider the ratio of false positives to false negatives in the patent antitrust area. A high error cost would imply that antitrust should be reluctant to restrain patentees. Moreover, proof standards and legal doctrines should be biased toward protecting innovation incentives.
We nd that the relevant error cost ratio for patent antitrust is the ratio of the sum of the monopoly prot and the residual consumer surplus to the deadweight loss. This is dierent from the prot-deadweight loss (reward-social loss) ratio advanced in the literature (Kaplow, 1984; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990 ; Klemperer, 1990 ). The reward-loss ratio is a doubtful measure of the patentantitrust welfare tradeo because it does not take into account the residual surplus to consumers, and thereby underweights the social value of innovation.
We nd that the error cost ratio, for a wide variety of deterministic demand functions, ranges from innity to a low of roughly three. This supports a bias, when designing legal standards and proof standards in patent antitrust law, in favor of the patent holder.
Baseline Model
We assume patent protection gives the innovator a monopoly in a market that exists only because of a prior investment by the innovator. In the rst period, the prospective patentee invests in innovation, and in the second period, the innovator is awarded a patent (with probability one) that guarantees a monopoly in the market created by the innovation. The patentee anticipates all of this when he invests in innovation in the rst period.
Under competition, price would marginal cost, p c = c, and the competitive quantity q c = p −1 (p c ). Figure 1 illustrates the standard monopoly outcome, with prot denoted by Π, the residual surplus denoted RS, and deadweight loss, from constraining output below the competitive level, D.
Error Cost Ratio
In this part, we consider the welfare tradeos of antitrust enforcement in the intellectual property area. Although we focus on patents, the model applies equally to many other types of intellectual property (copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks). Figure 1 illustrates our basic argument. In the gure, p BE is the break-even price necessary for even when charging the monopoly price. the innovator to recover the xed (sunk) costs of innovation. If the price the rm expects to receive in the second period is less than the break-even price, the rm will not invest in innovation (research and development, R&D).
We incorporate antitrust, in Figure 1 , as a mechanism that operates as a price regulation,p. This is dierent from the more traditional economic model of antitrust operating as a penalty imposed on monopolizing rms.
2 Here, antitrust operates as an injunction, constraining the rm from choosing its preferred price-output combination along the demand curve.
If the anticipated antitrust-regulated price cap is greater than the break-even price, the rm will innovate and charge up to the price cap. If the anticipated antitrust price cap is less than the break-even price, the rm will not invest in the rst period, and no entry will occur.
The most stringent antitrust regime is equivalent to a price cap equal to marginal cost. In this case, antitrust is so eective that the innovator will be forced to charge the competitive price in the second period. Obviously, investment will occur in the rst period, in this case, only if the breakeven price is equal to marginal cost. That will occur only if research and development is essentially costless, which is likely to be rare. An example of an injunctive policy that would implement a price cap equal to marginal cost is a rule denying enforceability to the patent, thus opening the market to competition and driving price down to marginal cost.
The most relaxed antitrust regime would set the eective price cap at the monopoly price p .
With an antitrust-regulated price cap greater than or equal to the monopoly price, the innovator would never be deterred by the threat of antitrust regulation from investing.
Perfect antitrust, in this model, reduces to setting the antitrust price cap equal to the break-even price. With the antitrust cap set at the break-even price, the innovator will invest, and society will get the benet from innovation with the smallest possible deadweight loss.
If the antitrust price cap is less than the break-even price, society loses the gain from innovation.
The rm will not invest in innovation and the minimum social loss is the sum of consumer's surplus and the rm's prot in the unconstrained regime,
Society does not lose the potential welfare captured by area D in Figure 1 because this portion of the potential surplus from innovation would never have been available to society in the unconstrained regime.
3
In contrast, if the antitrust-regulated price cap is greater than the break-even price, the maximum 2 See Becker (1968), Landes (1983) , Hylton and Lin (2014) .
3 All of this assumes, of course, that the patent award is based on an innovation rather than a fraud on the patent oce, or corruption in the patent system. In the latter case, no new surplus is created, and the social loss from setting the price cap below the break-even price would be zero. Consider, for example, a patent for playing cards, as in Darcy v. Allein, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1603). As a general matter one could introduce a measure of the probability of real innovation (in contrast to fraudulent) and multiply the sum of prot and residual surplus by such a validity probability to arrive at a measure of the social loss. The analysis here assumes implicitly that the validity probability is one. society will lose is the deadweight loss D, given by
Errors, in this framework, are deviations from perfect antitrust enforcement. An error in the direction of excessive enforcement, where the antitrust price cap is below the break-even price, results in false conviction or false positive costs. Errors in the direction of too little enforcement, where the antitrust price cap is greater than the break-even price, result in false acquittal or false negative costs. For enforcement authorities, the error cost ratio -that is, the ratio of false positive costs to false negative costs -provides guidance on the optimal direction of any bias due to errors in enforcement. For adjudicatory tribunals, the error cost ratio provides guidance on the standard of proof that should govern in disputes over whether a rm has violated antitrust law. More generally, the error cost ratio also serves as a measure of the welfare tradeo relevant to any conict between the scope of the patent laws and the scope of antitrust laws. This measure of the welfare tradeo diers from the ratio test (reward-to-social-loss ratio) advanced in parts of the patent antitrust literature.
Given the foregoing, the most conservative measure of the error cost ratio is represented by
This quotient provides a lower-bound measure, taking account the dierent levels of stringency in antitrust enforcement, of the ratio of the cost of excessive enforcement (false convictions) to the cost of inadequate enforcement (false acquittals) in the patent antitrust area.
Under traditional decision theory arguments (Kaplan, 1968 ; Burtis, Gelbach, Kobayashi, 2018), an error cost ratio equal to one would justify a balanced approach to the standard of proof, such as the preponderance standard. Such a standard would treat prospective errors in the direction of excessive enforcement as equally costly as prospective errors in the direction of lenient enforcement.
On the other hand, a ratio of one third would justify an approach that favors patent challengers (implementers), say by adopting a rebuttable presumption of guilt in patent-antitrust cases. A ratio considerably higher than one, such as three, would justify a proof standard favoring the innovator.
These implications of the error cost ratio should be considered while also taking into account that it is a minimum estimate. Thus, if the ratio presented above is greater than one, given a particular market structure, the actual ratio in applications to specic regulatory interventions within the particular market typically will be even greater. If the ratio is greater than one, then the case for adopting a proof standard favoring the innovator is even stronger than implied by the numerical value of the ratio. 
Under linear demand, the error cost ratio is a constant value of three. If the error cost ratio happened to be one, there would be a credible argument for adopting a balanced approach to patent antitrust where the risk of excessive enforcement is equated with the risk of inadequate enforcement.
In terms of proof standards for adjudication, this would be equivalent to a preponderance test.
However, an error cost ratio of three is more consistent with a biased approach to the risk of excessive enforcement, where the bias favors leniency toward the regulated party (Burtis, Gelbach, Kobayashi, 2018). Alternatively, the ratio of three suggests in the adjudication setting a clear and convincing standard of proof. We consider below whether this implication is also valid for other common representations of consumer demand.
Power-law Demand
In this part we consider power-law demand functions, such as the isoelastic, algebraic, and exponential forms. The advantage of these forms over the linear is that they better represent demand in settings of wealth inequality or where a relatively small number of consumers bid intensively for the good (e.g, medical care).
Consider the algebraic demand form, p = αq β − σ, β ∈ (−1, 0). After that, we will examine the results under isoelastic and exponential functional form. Linear and isoelastic demand functions are special cases of the algebraic form. In particular, if α = −b, β = 1, and σ = −A, the algebraic demand function turns to be a linear demand function. If σ = 0, the algebraic demand function becomes an isoelastic demand function, p = αq β .
Proposition 2 (Algebraic Demand). If the demand curve is algebraic p = αq β − σ, β ∈ (−1, 0), and marginal cost is a constant c, then the minimum false conviction cost is RS + π = (σ + c)
and the maximum false acquittal cost is D = (σ + c)
. 4 Therefore, the error cost ratio is
which ranges, as the elasticity of demand increases, from +∞ to a lower bound of , allows us to examine the behavior of the error cost ratio as demand elasticity goes to innity.
5 As demand becomes more inelastic, the error cost ratio approaches innity. As demand becomes more elastic, the error cost ratio falls to its lower bound
In more intuitive terms, Proposition 2 says that for relatively uncompetitive markets -where the elasticity of demand is still above but close to one -the error cost ratio is extremely high. For such markets, the sum of prot and consumer surplus is very large relative to deadweight loss, and society loses much more than one dollar for each dollar of deadweight loss avoided through excessive antitrust regulaiton. The error cost ratio falls toward its lower bound of roughly 2.8 as the market moves toward perfect competition. 
Proposition 3 (Isoelastic Demand). If the demand curve is isoelastic
. Therefore, the error cost ratio is
This case delivers the same result as the algebraic demand case, and again the error cost ratio ranges with the elasticity of demand from positive innity to a limiting lower bound of 1 e/2−1 . Figure   2 shows the relationship between the error cost ratio and the elasticity of demand for the isoelastic case. 5 Since the dependent variable of interest is the error cost ratio, which assumes optimization by the monopolist, we could just as well examine the point elasticity at the optimal output level. Substituting the monopoly price,
, so that the parameter ≡ − 1 β closely tracks the relevant point elasticity measure. If σ is small relative to c, then the parameter is a nearly precise measure of point elasticity at the privately optimal quantity. 6 In Figure 2 , the error cost ratio is equal to 3 when elasticity is equal to 2, equal to 4 when elasticity is roughly 1.3, and equal to 6 when elasticity is roughly 1. Like the linear case, exponential demand delivers an error cost ratio that is independent of market structure as measured by the elasticity of demand. Of the demand functions considered in this part, the exponential generates the lowest error cost ratio, which is a constant value of 1 e/2−1 ≈ 2.8. 7
The linear and the exponential also share the feature that there is a maximum price that consumers are willing to pay, above which demand falls to zero. However, in most markets, there is always some consumer willing to bid up the price of a scarce item. In particular, in markets characterized by wealth inequality among consumers, the wealthiest consumers can bid up the price of a scarce and highly desirable good (e.g., housing) to a level that is quite well beyond aordability for the average consumer. Given this, the algebraic probably best captures the features of real markets. That the error cost ratio for the exponential is less than that of the linear is consistent with the feature that the ratio of the monopolistic output to the competitive output is lower in the exponential case than in the linear case.
The monopolistic output level is half of the competitive output level in the linear case, whereas in the exponential case the monopolistic level is equal to the competitive level divided by the natural base e. Since the deadweight loss from monopoly is generally greater under exponential demand, the error cost ratio associated with antitrust intervention is lower.
This section presents an extended model incorporating the probability of violating antitrust law to explicitly model the rm's stage-1 investment decision and the error cost ratio. The reason is to separate the eect of market structure on the probability of entry (investment) and on the error cost ratio. By separating these two eects, we can capture both the static and dynamic eects of changes in market structure on the error cost ratio.
At stage 1, the rm observes the R&D investment cost K and decides whether to invest in innovation. The choice variable at stage 1 is denoted as r ∈ {0, 1}, where r = 1 denotes the rm invests in R&D and enters the subgame of stage 2, and r = 0 denotes the rm dose not enter and the game ends. If r = 1, the rm incurs the xed cost of R&D and enters into stage 2. At stage 2, the rm is possibly faced with antitrust challenge. Let v denote the probability that the rm is held violating the antitrust law and gets zero economic prot in stage 2.
This framework diers from the previous part by treating antitrust enforcement as all or nothing. As a result, the error cost ratio is the same as before, though this time it represents the consistent value, given a specic demand curve, rather than the minimum taking account dierent levels of enforcement stringency. However, the probability of enforcement aects the incentive to invest and the likelihood of deadweight loss arising.
Stage-1 Choice
Assume that the probability of antitrust legal enforcement is xed at a level v, v ∈ (0, 1). The innovation investment cost K follows cumulative density function F , which is dierentiable and its derivative F (K) . = f (K) is positive everywhere. Assume the rm is risk neutral.
We solve the rm's entry game by backward induction. From our proceeding result in the previous section, if the rm continues to stage 2 as a monopoly, it charges monopoly price p * and gets monopoly prot π * . Given that v is the probability that the rm is held in violation of the antitrust law, the expected stage-2 utility is
where r = 1 means that the rm invests in R&D in stage 1, U 2 denotes the rm's utility at stage 2.
If the rm does not invest in R&D, it earns zero. It optimizes by choosing whether to invest or not in stage 1. Thus the rm's stage 1 maximal utility is
Therefore, the rm invests in R&D to continue in stage 2, if and
Let θ denote the probability that the rm invests in R&D, and is called probability of entry in later analyses. 8 We have the following expression for θ,
To study the eect of market structure on rm's R&D investment decision, we study how market structure aects the monopoly prot π * which then determines the rm's entry decision.
The condition in Equation (1) indicates, in accord with intuition, that the rm's investment decision depends positively on the monopoly prot expected at stage 2.
The Probability of Entry and the Adjusted Error Cost Ratio As analyzed in the proceeding part, if the rm does not invest in R&D, the society loses RS + π. If the rm invests in R&D and monopolizes in stage 2, the society loses monopoly deadweight loss D. Taking the rm's R&D probability into consideration, the adjusted error cost ratio is
The eect of entry probability on error cost is captured by the partial derivative ofρ with regard to θ, which is given by
Thus, the error cost ratio decreases as the likelihood of innovation investment increases, and this negative relationship grows at an increasing rate. Other things equal, excessive enforcement is less harmful to society where there are strong incentives to invest because of high expected monopoly prots or low research and development costs. In addition, a little increase in the investment probability has a larger downward eect on the error cost ratio in an industry where rms have more and frequent R&D than in an industry with less R&D intensity.
8 Because R&D investment is a xed amount, the optimality decision for the patentee is straightforward, unlike the Nordaus (1967) model where the innovator chooses the amount to invest in innovation and therefore equates the marginal cost of investment with its marginal private benet. Treating R&D investment as a lump sum seems defensible, since the end goal of the innovator is some denite new product in this model. The inventor cannot invest half of the required amount in R&D and get some fraction of the payo. The variation in K reects the implicit assumption that the cost of the required investment is greater for some innovators than for others.
Eect of Market Structure
The price elasticity of demand is an important feature of market structure, and usually varies across industries (Johnson and Helmberger, 1967) . A number of industry-specic characteristics contribute to the pattern of demand elasticity, such as the degree of substitutability between goods. If a product does not have substitutes, such as some drugs and treatments for rare diseases, the product's demand is likely to be inelastic. Path dependence (switching costs) is another factor giving rise to inelastic demand (Klemperer, 1987) . Path dependence is a common feature observed in the demand for high tech products, such as online platforms and operating systems. Because consumers take time to adapt to a new technology, they tend to continue using related products from the same rm and are willing to pay a price premium for doing so. Generally speaking, a low demand elasticity reveals the consumer's high tolerance to price increases, and that the monopolist can exploit this high tolerance to earn more prots. In this sense, an industry with low demand elasticity is favorable for a monopoly rm (Kamien and Schwartz (1970) ).
Of course, demand elasticity varies along the demand curve in most cases. To study the eect of demand elasticity on proft, we will rst have to construct a parameter that tracks the elasticity measure at all points along the demand curve. By examining the relationship between such a measure of elasticity and prot, we can draw inferences on the relationship between market structure and protability.
We start by considering the power demand functions: isoelastic, algebraic, and exponential. For the isoelastic form p = αq β , β < 0, the price elasticity of demand is simply = − 1 β , which obviously tracks elasticity at all points along the demand curve. The monopoly prot under isoelastic demand can be expressed as a function of demand elasticity
Generally, the elasticity of demand for each of the power demand functions can be expressed as
, where the is a parameter that tracks the elasticity of demand. In the algebraic case
, so that = − 9 One example is Android system or iOS. After a consumer purchases the rst Apple product and gets used to the iOS system, the iOS shapes the consumer's habit of using smartphones. If she changes to the Android system, it takes her time to adjust.
Although the parameterization is not as straightforward, a similar decomposition can be accomplished with linear demand, where the same negative relationship between prot and the elasticity tracking parameter holds. Recall that in section 3, we demonstrated that the probability of investment (entry) increases with monopoly prot. Combining this with the negative relationship between prot and demand elasticity, we expect that the inelastic market demand generates higher investment and entry probability.
To consider the eect of market structure on the error cost ratio, we analyze the derivative of the error cost ratio with respect to elasticity, i.e.,
where the rst part in Equation (4), which is negative, is the static eect of elasticity on the error cost ratio, discussed in section 2. The second term, which is positive, captures the dynamic eect of the demand elasticity on the error cost ratio. As the post-patent award market becomes more competitive, because of the greater availability of substitutes, investment and entry are less likely, increasing the error cost ratio. On one hand, low elasticity leads a higher monopoly prot and residual surplus relative to deadweight loss, leading to a larger error cost as the direct impact, which we call the static eect in this model. On the other hand, the higher monopoly prot expected in stage 2 encourages entry, partially osetting the static eect.
The conicting static and dynamic eects suggest that the relationship between demand elasticity and error cost may not be negative as suggested in some of our earlier analyses of demand functions. The limiting ratio derived for the algebraic and isoelastic cases is larger than 1 e/2−1 when the entry/investment eect is taken into account. Indeed, for the linear and exponential cases, where the static eect is zero, increasing demand elasticity (making the market more competitive) generates only a dynamic eect, raising the limiting error cost ratio.
Example: Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distribution.
As an illustration, assume demand is isoelastic and that the probability distribution that determines θ is uniform, i.e., the R&D investment cost K follows a uniform distribution on (0,K], whereK 10 One could, for example, express elasticity as a function of price in the linear case as (p) ≡ denotes the upper bound of investment cost. It follows that if expected prot is greater than the upper bound on investment cost, the rm is sure to enter. If expected prot is below the upper bound, then the entry probability is determined by the cumulative distribution function of K. Formally, we
The adjusted error cost ratio taking into account the dynamic eect of enforcement can now be expressed as a function of demand elasticitỹ
where π * = −1 c −1 α . Dierentiating with respect to elasticity,
The rst line in equation (5) reects the static eect, which is negative, 11 while the second line is that of the dynamic eect, which is positive. 
This illustrates our argument that the static eect takes negative sign.
12 As the expected prot, investment cost and the error cost ratio are all positive, we haveK (1−v)π * ρ > 0. From the negative relationship between elasticity and monopoly prot under isoelastic demand (appendix A3), we have that
Combine these results, we have that
This implies a positive dynamic eect of demand elasticity on the error cost ratio. 
If this condition holds (6), the static eect is dominant and the adjusted error cost ratio decreases with elasticity. Otherwise, the error cost ratio increases with elasticity, the opposite of our result in Section 2. Figure 3 shows a simulation of the relationship between static and dynamic eects, and of the relationship between the adjusted and static error cost ratios. Both gures assume a modest antitrust enforcement probability of 0.2.
13 As shown in Figure 3a , the dynamic eect overtakes the static eect after the elasticity becomes greater than 1.06. Figure 3b compares the error cost ratio and the adjusted error cost ratio curves. For relatively low elasticity values, the adjusted error cost ratio is below the error cost ratio. For relatively high elasticity levels, the adjusted curve is above the static error cost ratio, eventually going to innity.
The intuition behind this pattern is the following. For high elasticity values, the market is relatively competitive, and prot expectations are low. As a result, the rate of entry/investment is low, and approaching zero as the market becomes perfectly competitive. Because entry is so low, and the expectant deadweight loss from monopoly pricing therefore low, the adjusted error cost ratio steadily goes to innity.
Conversely, when the demand elasticity is relatively low, so that the market is not competitive, rms expected to earn relatively large prots. Now the likelihood of entry and investment is high, reducing the adjusted error cost ratio below its static counterpart.
Though the adjusted error cost ratio dips below the (static) error cost ratio for low elasticity values (i.e., uncompetitive markets), note that it is always well above the asymptotic limit of 1 e/2−1 for the isoelastic demand case. Indeed, the minimum value of the adjusted error cost ratio in this simulation is greater than ve. In the appendix we consider additional simulations with higher probabilities of enforcement, one intermediate with the probability enforcement set at 0.5 and the other a high-enforcement regime with a probability of 0.8. In both of the additional simulations the adjusted error cost ratio is greater, at each elasticity value, than in modest enforcement regime simulated in Figure 3 .
Although we believe the assumptions in these simulations are reasonable, we do not intend to suggest that they provide a representation of the relationship of the error cost ratio to the adjusted error cost ratio for every conceivable demand function or investment cost distribution. It is possible to generate an example where the adjusted ratio falls below one. Indeed, in the case of exponential demand, where the error cost ratio has a constant value, the adjusted ratio could start from a level below the error cost ratio (for low elasticity) before going to innity.
14 Given this, a measure of the average value of the adjusted error cost ratio over a wide range of elasticity values might oer an alternative single measurement.
Implications
The foregoing analysis has examined the welfare tradeos of antitrust enforcement in the innovation setting. We have focused on antitrust regulation of patentees, though the issues addressed here apply to any area where rms make investments that create new markets or substantially enhance existing markets. The tradeos examined here have implications for many facets of law enforcement. First, society must determine the level of resources to pour into the antitrust enforcement eort against patent holders. In other words, what is the optimal probability of enforcement when monopolists have obtained their status through innovation? Second, society must determine an optimal legal standard -for example, whether to apply a per se prohibition, a per se legality rule, or a rule of reason test. Third, society must choose the optimal standard of proof in trials, where the occurrence of an antitrust violation under the operable legal standard is uncertain. For each of these questions, the tradeo between the costs of excessive enforcement and the costs of inadequate enforcement should be considered in determining the features of an optimal enforcement system. 14 For high enforcement probabilities, the adjusted error cost ratio curve will always be above the error cost ratio curve for all elasticity parameter values. However, for low enforcement probabilities it is possible to get a range of low elasticity values where the adjusted error cost curve is below the error cost curve under certain parameter values, but this requires an assumption that the upper bound on investment cost in the uniform probability model is modest relative to expected prot. Such an assumption would appear to go against intuition.
In this paper's model, we begin with a perfect enforcement ideal, and consider the cost of deviating from the ideal toward excessive enforcement, and the cost of deviating from the ideal toward inadequate enforcement. The ratio of these two costs, which we label the error cost ratio, constitutes the appropriate welfare ratio test for determining optimal antitrust enforcement in the patent context. The perfect enforcement ideal is met when antitrust enforcement enables the innovating monopolist to recover its research and development costs, and also prevents the rm from imposing unnecessary deadweight loss on society.
Using the foregoing approach to dening perfect enforcement, we nd that the error cost ratio for patent antitrust, or alternatively the appropriate welfare tradeo ratio for patent antitrust, is equal to the sum of the monopoly prot and the residual consumer surplus all divided by the deadweight loss. This nding contradicts the view suggested in the literature (Kaplow, 1984; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990 ) that the relevant welfare ratio for patent antitrust is the prot divided by the deadweight loss (reward-loss ratio).
The reward-loss ratio appears to be invalid for assessing the welfare tradeos in patent antitrust because it accords inadequate weight to the residual surplus going to consumers, and in doing so undercounts the social value of innovation. One immediate implication is that prescriptions for patent antitrust law based on the reward-loss framework should be reconsidered from a perspective that gives greater consideration to the social incentive to innovate.
We nd that the error cost ratio is genearlly well above one, and declines as function of market competitiveness as measured by the elasticity of demand. The minimum value of the ratio is roughly equal to three under commonly used demand functions. When the eects of enforcement on innovation are taken into account, the adjusted error cost ratio is likely to be even greater, and tends toward innity as the elasticity of demand increases. These results suggest that society should show a greater concern for the costs of excessive enforcement than the costs of inadequate enforcement of antitrust in the patent context. The law should err on the side of protecting innovation incentives.
These implications have immediate practical relevance. There are novel theories of antitrust being applied to patentees currently. In an ongoing lawsuit against Qualcomm, the FTC claims that the rm's patent licensing fees are an abusive exercise of monopoly power. Such eorts to introduce antitrust regulation into areas that had until recently been controlled almost entirely by patent law should be assessed under a consideration of the associated error costs. An attack on patent pricing as a form of monopoly abuse is equivalent to introducing price regulation through antitrust. Determination of the welfare-maximizing antitrust price cap, which encourages innovation and at the same time avoids unnecessary deadweight loss, is subject to uncertainty. Such an eort should err on the side of protecting innovation incentives, given the high ratio of false-positive costs to false-negative costs.
In other areas of litigation, courts must determine whether to apply a per se legality test, per se illegality test, or rule of reason test to alleged antitrust violations by patent holders. 
Conclusion
The error cost ratio -that is, the ratio of false-positive to false-negative costs -for patent antitrust is equal to the sum of the monopoly prot and residual consumer surplus all divided by the deadweight loss. We nd that this ratio ranges from innity, in uncompetitive markets (no substitutes to the patent), to a low of roughly three, in competitive markets, for commonly used demand functions.
When we extend the analysis to take enforcement's eect on entry into account, we nd that the range of values for the ratio is even higher under reasonable assumptions. This implies that patent antitrust rules, from substantive law to proof standards, should tilt generally in favor of patentees. 
Therefore, the error cost ratio is
Proposition 4.
The demand curve is exponential q = γe −βp and the marginal cost is a constant c. The inverse demand curve is p = β −1 ln γ − β −1 ln q. Optimal output satises β −1 ln γ − β −1 ln q − β −1 = c, so that q = γe −(βc+1) and p = βc+1 β
. The competitive price is p c = c and output is q c = γe −βc . The social loss under antitrust law that deters rm's entry is
and the social loss if the rm is allowed to enter the market is
The error cost ratio is
A.2 Eect of Elasticity on Error Cost Ratio under Isoelastic Demand
From proposition 1 and 4, we have that the error cost ratio is a constant number when the demand function is linear or exponential. However, when the demand function is algebraic p = αq β − σ, or is isoelasticp = αq β , where β ∈ (−1, 0), the error cost ratio is a function of demand elasticity. We claim that the ratio ρ decreases with regard
According to proposition 2 and 3, the error cost ratio is given by ρ = 1
Since demand elasticity parameter is given by
, we have ρ = 1 
To derive d ln
, we rst compute ln
and have
Then we have the derivative
Then we have Claim 1. ∀ ∈ (1, +∞),
Proof: Since β ∈ (−1, 0), we have ∈ (1, +∞). Then we show that ln(
is monotonically decreasing with in (1, +∞).
We rst derive the derivative of ln(
with regard to , as follows
The last equality is from ∈ (1, +∞). This proves that ln(
is monotonically decreasing with in (1, +∞), i.e., ∀ ∈ (1, +∞), ln(
Then we have
Thus, we have ∀ ∈ (1, +∞), ln(
Plug the equation (8) back in equation 7, we have
From Claim 1, we have ln(
A3. Negative Relationship between Elasticity and Prot Lemma 2. (Negative Relationship between Elasticity and Prot) The price elasticity functions for these demand representations are given by: (i) The isoelastic demand function takes a constant elasticity:
(ii) The price elasticity of algebraic demand function is given by
(iii) The price elasticity of exponential demand function is given by
Then, the prot is an decreasing function in price elasticity, i.e., ∂π * ∂ < 0 for the above three cases.
Case I: Isolastic Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Proposition 3, we have that, under isoelastic demand, the monopoly price and quantity are given by
Then we have the monopoly prot is given by 
We can back out the sign of derivative From Equation (14) ∂ (lnπ * )
Then from the model primitive β ∈ (−1, 0),we have
Assume 0 < α < c, then ln α c < 0, then we have ∀ ∈ (1, +∞),
Case II: Algebraic Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Proposition 2, we have that, q = σ+c α(β+1) 1/β and monopolistic price is p = σ+c β+1 − σ.
Then we have the monopoly prot is given by
We can back out the sign of derivative 
Then from the model primitive β ∈ (−1, 0), we have
Similarly as the analysis on isoelastic demand function, if c + σ > α, we have that
Case III: Exponential Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Proposition 4, the monopoly quantity, under exponential demand function, is q = γe −(βc+1) and monopolistic price is p = βc+1 β
. The monopoly prot is given by π * = (p * − c) q = γ β e (−1−βc) .
From proceeding result, we have that the elasticity parameter From the demand function's primitive setup, we have that γ > 0, and β > 0. Thus, ∂π * ∂β < 0.
A4. Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distribution of Investment Cost
Assume the R&D investment cost follows uniform distribution on (0,K]. To compute the adjusted error cost ratio, we rst compute the probability of a rm with the rm's entry decision in period 1. Then we have the entry probability denoted as θ is given by
Then we have the adjusted ratio is given bỹ 
Appendix B. Simulations with Varying Enforcement Probability
In this appendix, we show how the adjusted error cost ratio changes according to the antitrust enforcement probability. In the main text, we show the adjusted error cost ratio and corresponding static and dynamic eects under a modest enforcement probability, v = 0.2. If the enforcement probability increases, the adjusted error cost ratio curve shifts up. So does the dynamic eect curves, while the change in the static eect is smaller than the change in the dynamic eect.
Medium Enforcement Probability In Figure 4 , we assume the enforcement probability is at the intermediate level, v = 0.5. The adjusted error cost ratio is higher than that under v = 0.2 (see Figure 3 in main text). The lower bound of the adjusted error cost ratio now is about 13, which occurs when the demand elasticity is about 1.09. High Enforcement Probability In Figure 5 , we assume the enforcement probability is high, v = 0.8. The adjusted error cost ratio curve shifts up further in Figure 5 than in Figure 4 . The lower bound of the adjusted error cost ratio now is about 42, which occurs when the demand elasticity is about 1.11. 
